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STATE INCOME TAXATION OF NONMEMBER INDIANS IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Jennifer Nutt Carleton*
A long-standing tension exists between Indian peoples who enjoy the
protection of a Congress that retains plenary power over Indian affairs,' and
the individual states in which Indian reservations are located. One need only
look to the disagreements between states and Indian nations located within
their borders over the issues of gaming compacts, environmental regulation,
treaty rights, and land claims to see the modem results of this tension.
Congress attempts to address this problem through the use of federal
legislation arbitrating the boundaries of state and tribal jurisdiction, with
limited success.2
In the most contentious arena of all, state taxation of activities within
Indian Country, Congress remains silent. Congress has not passed a single
law specifically addressing the ability of a state to tax individuals, activities,
or income within Indian Country? Faced with this congressional silence, the
task of developing standards for the levying of state taxes in Indian Country
falls to state and federal courts, again with mixed results.
As a general rule, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it, a state is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation
*B.A., 1991, Indiana University; J.D., 1996, University of Wisconsin Law School. Senior
staff attorney, Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin. Special thanks to Attorney Gerald L.
Hill for all his help and guidance in the writing of this article, and to Francis J. Carleton for
his encouragement and support.
I. "It must be remembered that tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to,
only the Federal Government, not the States." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
2. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (2000) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(2000)); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000); Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)) (Public Law 280).
3. Indian country is:
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation.., and all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). "Indian country may be reservation land, reservation land which
has been allotted, or land which is occupied by a 'dependent Indian community.'" Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
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Indians." Unfortunately, this rule raises more questions than it answers. What
constitutes "reservation lands" and "reservation Indians" is a decades-long
debate between Indian peoples and state governments.
Joan LaRock v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue presented the Wisconsin
Supreme Court with the following question: Should a Menominee Indian
living and working on the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin Reservation
be subject to the State of Wisconsin's taxation of income? The Wisconsin
Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that Joan
LaRock, a Menominee Indian, living and working on the Oneida Reservation
is subject to the State of Wisconsin's income taxation
This question of first impression in Wisconsin affected not only the eleven
Indian Tribes within the state' and the thousands of Indians that live and
work in Indian Country located in Wisconsin, it also set a precedent for
future extension of state taxation in Indian Country. This article examines the
Indian tax case law leading up to LaRock and the arguments presented by the
taxpayer in that case. This article then analyzes the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's holding in LaRock, which has already proven to be a guidepost for
subsequent Indian tax adjudication. Finally, this article discusses the
implications of LaRock for Indian people, Indian reservations, and Indian
identity.
L Procedural History
Joan LaRock resided on land that is part of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wisconsin Reservation.7 She worked at the Oneida Bingo and Casino, a
business wholly owned and operated by the Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wisconsin." The land upon which Ms. LaRock resided, as well as the land
upon which the Casino is located, are titled to the United States of America
and held in trust for the Oneida Tribe.
Ms. LaRock is an enrolled member of the Menominee Indian Tribe. She
married an Oneida Indian, with whom she had four children. Joan LaRock's
4. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995).
5. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907 (2001).
6. The eleven Indian Tribes in the State of Wisconsin are the Bad River Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians, the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin, the Ho-
Chunk Nation, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, the Lac
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin, the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, the Sokaogon Chippewa Community, the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of
Wisconsin, and the Stockbridge-Munsee Community.





children are all enrolled members of the Oneida Tribe."
In 1996, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) sent notice to Joan
LaRock that she owed $588.80 plus interest for income earned in 1994 and
1995."' Ms. LaRock appealed the DOR's finding to the Wisconsin Tax
Appeals Commission. The Tax Appeals Commission entered a decision and
order dated May 11, 1998, awarding summary judgement in favor of the
DOR." The Tax Appeals Commission held that the State of Wisconsin may
impose a tax on the income of Joan LaRock because she did not live on the
Menominee Indian Reservation at the time she earned the income. "[Tihe
absence of proper residency or the proper situs for income is fatal to an
Indian seeking immunity from state income tax. We hold that nonmember
status on a reservation is also disqualifying."'2
On appeal to the Brown County District Court, Judge Zuidmulder upheld
the findings of the Tax Appeals Commission in a decision and order dated
February 11, 1999.'" Judge Zuidmulder held that because Joan LaRock is
not an Oneida Indian, the State of Wisconsin may tax her income. "It follows
that since Petitioner is not a member of the Oneida Nation [sic], she enjoys
no protected status that would allow her to claim immunity from the duty she
owes as a citizen of the State of Wisconsin to pay income taxes."" On
December 28, 1999, a three-judge panel of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision and order issued by Judge Zuidmulder.' The court of
appeals examined the treaties creating the Oneida Reservation and the
congressional acts delineating the state's jurisdiction within Indian Country,
and could not "conclude that the treaties or federal statutes preempt state tax
jurisdiction here."'"
On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Joan LaRock argued that
federal, not state, law determines an individual's status as an "Indian" and
what constitutes "Indian Country;" that Congress never expressly granted the
State of Wisconsin the power to tax Indians living on the Oneida Reser-
vation; and consequently, the State of Wisconsin's taxation of her income is
prohibited. Ms. LaRock argued that, although she is a not a member of the
9. Id. at 908-09.
10. Id.
11. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, No. 96-1-539, slip op. at 15 (Wis. Tax Appeals
Comm'n May 11, 1998).
12. Id. at 8.
13. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, No. 98CV723, slip op. at 5 (Brown County Dist.
Ct. Feb. 11, 1999).
14. Id.
15. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 606 N.W.2d 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
16. Id. at 584.
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Oneida Tribe, she maintains her special status as an Indian, regardless of her
residence. Ms. LaRock also argued that the federal treaties creating the
Oneida Reservation and congressional recognition of the Oneida Reservation
as Indian Country preempt the imposition of Wisconsin's income tax. Ms.
LaRock maintained that the State of Wisconsin has no jurisdiction to tax the
income of Indians that live and derive their income from Indian Country,
unless specifically granted this jurisdiction by Congress. Because Congress
did not act to grant this authority to the State of Wisconsin, Ms. LaRock took
the position that the State's taxation of her income was prohibited. 7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. In a decision authored by Justice
Wilcox, the court upheld the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
finding that "the State is not barred by principles of tribal sovereignty from
taxing LaRock's income because, although she is an enrolled member of the
Menominee Tribe, she is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe.""'
II. Backdrop of Indian Sovereignty
In general, states do not have the power to tax Indian tribes or their
members on activities within Indian Country.'9 Congress can authorize state
authority to tax Indian lands, but such authorization must be "unmistakably
clear: '
In The Kansas Indians, for example, the Court ruled that lands
held by Indians in common as well as those held in severalty were
exempt from state taxation.... [In The New York Indians, the
Court characterized the State's attempt to tax Indian reservation
land as extraordinary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, and "an
unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original title of
the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations." As the
Government points out, this Court has never wavered from the
views expressed in these cases.2'
Traditionally, Congress authorizes such state authority through federal
legislation or treaties. As noted on many occasions by the United States
Supreme Court, Indian sovereignty "provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."'
17. Id.
18. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Wis. 2001).
19. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 456 (1995).
20. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 258 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)).
21. Montana, 471 U.S. at 764-65 (citations omitted).




The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged this principle, then applied
it in a wholly unique way in the LaRock decision. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court noted that Congress has the power to open the doors of reservations to
state laws because it derives its power from the "federal responsibility for
regulating commerce with Indian tribes and treaty making."23 From this
basic tenet, the Wisconsin Supreme Court moved to the conclusion that it is
the tribe, and not the tribal member, that enjoys a trust relationship with the
federal government and that "the notion of the 'tribe,' grounded in our federal
constitution, is the essential political unit in American Indian law."' 4
The findings of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock are problematic
for a number of reasons. First and foremost, there exists a trust relationship
between the federal government and Indian peoples, not just Indian tribes.
Congress historically applies its laws and statutes to all Indians, regardless of
tribal membership. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act (commonly referred to
as the Indian Reorganization Act), an "Indian" is defined as: "all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under
Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any
Indian reservation .... " A "tribe" is defined as "any Indian tribe,
organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation. 26
"For nearly two hundred years, the operative distinction for jurisdictional
purposes in Indian country has been the distinction between Indians and non-
Indians, not Indian members and nonmembers."2 Congress repeatedly
enunciates its plenary authority over Indians within Indian Country,
regardless of tribal affiliation. Numerous federal statutes define "Indian" as
being "any person who is a member of an Indian tribe."2 The Department
of the Interior issued regulations governing the implementation of the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.' These
23. LaRock, 621 N.W.2d at 910 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.7).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Amicus Curiae Brief of Oneida Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and Forest County
Potawatomi Community at 2, LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907 (Wis.
2001) (No. 99-0951). In support of this proposition, the amici tribes cite to the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1802, the General Crimes Act, and the United States Supreme Court
decisions in Ex Parte Crow Dog, United States v. Rogers, United States v. Kagama,
Worcester v. Georgia, and McClanahan. Id. at 2-4.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 4402(4) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(9) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §
1996a(c)(1) (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 7881 (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 3703 (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 4103
(2000).
29. 48 C.F.R. § 1452.204-71 (1987); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(6) (1987).
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regulations specifically prohibit discrimination among Indians on the basis of
tribal affiliation in extending employment preference. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs also does not distinguish between members of various tribes for the
purposes of awarding benefits."
Reservation health care facilities funded by the United States government
must provide health services to all Indians, regardless of tribal affiliation."'
The language for this funding does not distinguish between Indians on the
basis of tribal membership." "Federally-administered programs and services
are provided to Indian people because of their status as Indians without
regard to whether their Tribal membership is the same as their reservation
residence.""
The logic behind this congressional policy is evident. The distinctions
between Indians become very fine when viewed in an historical light. The
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin migrated from their aboriginal lands
in New York. There are currently three Oneida Tribes, located in Wisconsin,
New York, and Canada. Originally, these Tribes were all one with a common
history, heritage, and culture.' Would the state's ability to tax nonmember
Indians be the same for a New York Oneida? The hair splitting becomes
even more acute in the case of the Bands of Chippewa who reside in
Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana.
In LaRock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court skirted this issue by noting that
each tribe and band are "distinct political units; therefore they are separate
federally recognized Indian tribes."35 This logic ignores the problematic
nature of federal recognition.' "The most precise definition of federal
30. See 25 C.F.R. § 20.20(a)(1-3) (1985); 25 C.F.R. § 256.3(b) (1991); 25 C.F.R. §
635.117(d) (1998).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000).
32. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395qq, 1396j (2000).
33. H.R. REP. No. 101-938, at 133 (1990).
34. See Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1985)
(citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 434 F. Supp. 527, 535 (D.C.N.Y.
1977)).
35. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 910 n.2 (2001).
36. Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 271 (2001); see also L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro
v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 60-61
(1994). Gould states:
Some who claim to be Indian, and who may receive preferences in
governmental programs upon such basis, may have less than 1/2000 Indian
blood. Others who gain tribal membership may have no Indian blood at all.
Still others of full blood may not even be recognized as Indians by the federal





recognition, as articled in United States v. Sandoval, describes it as the
federal government's decision to establish a government-to-government
relationship by recognizing a group of Indians as a dependent tribe under its
guardianship."" As argued by Joan LaRock before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, federal recognition of a particular tribe is not equal to the trust
responsibility of the federal government to individual Indians. Indians enjoy
a similar, equal but separate, trust relationship with the federal government."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that an individual's status as an
Indian is dependent on residence. This holding fails to recognize that an
Indian remains an Indian regardless of her residence. Wisconsin's eleven
Indian communities do not constitute homogenous groups of tribal members.
Indian people living within Indian Country include Bureau of Indian Affairs
and Indian Health Service employees, Indians married to members of other
tribes, as in the case of Ms. LaRock, the offspring of these marriages, and
increasing numbers of Indians residing and working on other reservations. 9
The State of Wisconsin recognizes this reality in the provision of social
services and economic grants to Wisconsin Indians.'
Treaties and statutes setting aside reservations for particular tribes often
provided that other Indians might be settled on the same reservations.4' The
United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the case of Topash v. Commis-
Id.
37. Myers, supra note 36, at 272 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46
(1913)).
38. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 181 (1973); see also Eugenia
Allison Phipps, The Burden of Proof in the Federal/Indian Fiduciary Relationship, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1637 (2000). "Despite the strong evidence of a fiduciary tie, courts, relying on a
distinction between the typical common law fiduciary relationship and the 'unique'
relationship between the government and the Indians, historically have refused to hold the
government to the full fiduciary standards imposed on other, private fiduciaries." hL
39. William Glaberson, Who Is a Seminole, and Who Gets to Decide?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2001, at Al.
40. See Wis. STAT. §§ 39.38, 39.40 (2000) (providing for student assistance to
Wisconsin Indian students and minority teachers); id. § 46.70 (providing for social services
to American Indians); id. § 46.71 (providing for the prevention and treatment of American
Indian drug abuse); id. §§ 560.86 to 560.875 (providing for an economic liaison program for
"tribal enterprises" and "Indian businesses" located on and off Indian reservations). None of
these Wisconsin social service programs distinguish on the basis of tribal affiliation,
regardless of an Indian's residence.
41. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 269 (1898); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535, 537 (1937); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 466-67
(1976).
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sioner of Revenue,42 setting forth examples of such treaties and statutes. In
its brief, the United States noted:
While federal policy has always recognized Indian tribes as
governmental entities, it has at the same time recognized Indians
as individuals, different from other individuals, and to whom
special rules apply. The particular tribe to which an individual
Indian belongs has been of no consequence insofar as his status
as an Indian vis-a-vis the federal government has been con-
cerned.43
In Topash, the United States took the position that the State of Minnesota's
attempts to tax the income of an Indian living and working in Indian Country
"ignores the whole tradition of Indian law, which gives special protection to
Indians, of whatever tribe, residing on Indian reservations."" The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed.
Topash involved an enrolled Tulalip Indian living and working within the
Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota. This individual sought a refund of state
taxes paid on the basis that, as an Indian, the state had no jurisdiction to tax
income derived from Indian Country sources. '5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that federal Indian jurisdiction includes Indians of all Tribes, and
thus preempts the State of Minnesota's ability to tax an Indian living in
Indian Country, regardless of tribal affiliation.' Ironically, a month before
oral arguments were presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock,
the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the Topash decision.
State v. R.M.H. addressed Minnesota's ability to enforce its speeding and
driver's license laws against an Indian who committed offenses on a state
highway located within the reservation of an Indian tribe of which he was not
an enrolled member."' The nonmember Indian relied on Topash in arguing
that the state's laws did not apply to him. In response, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota found that its holding in Topash was no longer controlling:
Our conclusion in Topash that Indian jurisdiction includes Indians
of all tribes conflicts with how the Supreme Court has defined
Indian sovereignty in Oliphant and its progeny, which cases lead
to a distinction between nonmember Indians and Indians who are
42. 291 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1980).
43. Amicus Curiae Brief of United States at 5, Topash v. Comm'r of Revenue, 291
N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1980) (No. 003248).
44. Id.
45. Topash, 291 N.W.2d at 680.
46. Id. at 683.




members of the tribe on whose reservation they reside. Our
reasoning in Topash is specifically refuted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Colville, where the Court reached the opposite result.
Because Supreme Court cases conflict with part of our decision in
Topash, we conclude that Topash is no longer controlling on this
issue.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court came to the same conclusion, reasoning that
a taxpayer's status as an Indian is somehow dependent on residence. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court even went so far as to note that "federal legislation
over the past century has sought in some instances to encourage tribal
coherence." '49 This holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock is
insupportable in light of congressional law and policy regarding the treatment
of Indians.
III. Residence in Indian Country
As noted above, a state is without power to tax reservation lands and
reservation Indians." The first question to be answered, therefore, is whether
an Indian resides in a state for the purposes of income taxation. In Wiscon-
sin, "residency" in a particular jurisdiction may serve as the basis for
taxation.' Wisconsin may tax persons resident within its borders who do
not live on reservations because it confers upon these persons the benefit of
domicile and its accompanying privileges and advantages." However, an
Indian's residence within Indian Country cannot serve as the basis for the
imposition of Wisconsin income tax.
In the leading case on income tax immunity of Indians, McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commissioner," the United States Supreme Court held
that a Navajo Indian, residing on the Navajo Reservation, was not subject to
state income tax for money earned on the reservation:
The residence of a tribal member is a significant component of the
McClanahan presumption against state tax jurisdiction. But our
cases make clear that a tribal member need not live on a formal
48. 1d at 64 (citations omitted).
49. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 910 (2001).
50. See discussion supra Part 11 (regarding backdrop of Indian sovereignty).
51. See Wis. STAT. § 71.02(1) (2000).
52. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Zeuske, 145 F. Supp.
2d 969, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
53. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
No. 11
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
reservation to be outside the State's taxing jurisdiction; it is
enough that the member live in "Indian country."'
If an Indian resides within Indian Country, the state has no jurisdiction to tax
the income of the Indian. Indians that live within Indian Country do not
"reside" in a state for income taxation purposes. The standard of review for
a tax levied on an Indian tribe or an Indian residing in Indian Country is as
follows: "Absent cession of jurisdiction or other Federal statutes permitting
it, . . . a state is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation
Indians.""5
The United States Supreme Court consistently differentiates between a
state's jurisdiction over Indians living in Indian Country and those that reside
outside Indian Country. In Chickasaw, the Supreme Court held that the State
of Oklahoma could tax income earned in Indian Country by Indians living
outside of Indian Country."' The key to this analysis was whether the
Indians in question lived in Indian Country, not whether they lived in their
own tribe's Indian Country. In Chickasaw, the residence of the taxpayer was
the determinative factor used by the Supreme Court to decide if the state had
taxing authority over the income of the Indians in question.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the importance of an Indian's
residence in Oklahoma Tax Commissioner v. Sac & Fox Nation.5 "To
determine whether a tribal member is exempt from State income taxes under
McClanahan, a court first must determine the residence of that tribal
member.""sR The question presented in Sac & Fox was whether the State of
Oklahoma-had the jurisdiction to tax employees of the Sac and Fox Nation."
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between
the taxation of tribal members and nonmembers. It found tribal members
exempt from income taxation, regardless of residence." The Tenth Circuit
further found that nonmembers of the Tribe, including nonmember Indians,
were subject to state income taxation regardless of their residence.'
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court could have simply
affirmed the findings on appeal of the Tenth Circuit, the Court did not
54. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).
55. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995) (citing County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)).
56. Id. at 464.
57. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
58. Id. at 124.
59. Sac & Fox Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 967 F.2d 1425, 1427 (10th Cir. 1992),
vacated by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
60. Id. at 1428-29.




distinguish between members and nonmembers of the Sac and Fox Nation to
determine if the state had jurisdiction to tax their income. Instead, the Court
remanded the case to determine whether all of the taxpayers in question
resided in Indian Country. "[W]e ask only whether the land is Indian
country." 2 According to the Supreme Court's analysis under Sac & Fox, the
determination of residency is independent from whether the individual
taxpayers are members of the Sac and Fox Nation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court echoed this emphasis on residency in
Anderson v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue.63 In Anderson, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court addressed whether the State of Wisconsin had the
authority to tax income earned within Indian Country by an Indian not
residing in Indian Country. The court found Mr. Anderson's income taxable,
noting that "Itihe tax upon Anderson's income only exists because Anderson
lives off-reservation. As the department conceded at oral argument, there
would not be a tax on the income at issue here if Anderson lived on the
reservation.""
It is interesting to note that the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in
Anderson that "the term 'reservation Indian' refers to an Indian living on the
reservation."' A Menominee Indian residing on the Oneida Reservation
clearly falls under this definition of a "reservation Indian." Nevertheless, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court "clarified" its holding in Anderson in its LaRock
decision, noting:
In Anderson, however, we were referring to the specific reser-
vation of the particular tribe in which Anderson was enrolled: the
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians.
LaRock attempts to stretch this definition to include all Indian
reservations, a proposition for which she provides no authority.
Inasmuch as LaRock is not an enrolled member of the Oneida
Tribe living on the Oneida Reservation, she is not a "reservation
Indian" as that term is used in United States Supreme Court
precedent or in our Anderson decision.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in LaRock does not comport with
the presumption that as long as an Indian resides in Indian Country and
derives her income from Indian Country, the state is presumed to have no
taxation jurisdiction. Under the United States Supreme Court's analysis in
62. Sac & Fox, 508 U.S. at 125.
63. 484 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. 1992).
64. Id. at 921-22.
65. Id. at 922.
66. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 916-17 (2001).
No. 11
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Sac & Fox, an Indian need not reside on her own reservation, or any
established reservation, to benefit from the presumption that the state has no
jurisdiction to tax her income. The Indian need only reside in Indian
Country.
IV. Federal Preemption of State Taxation
In Indian Country, no activity is presumed taxable by the state. A state
does not have the inherent ability to tax the income of an Indian living and
working in Indian Country. Any extension of the state's jurisdiction into
Indian Country must be at the express consent of Congress.67 Consequently,
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read to determine if they allow
state jurisdiction.
In 1948, Congress codified the concept of Indian Country under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151. In order to qualify as Indian Country, the federal government must
"set aside" the land in question for the exclusive use and occupancy of Indian
peoples. 8 Indian Country may be reservation land, allotted reservation land,
or land occupied by a dependent Indian community. 9 Indian Country is not
dependent on the presence of a governing tribe.
It is in the creation and oversight of Indian Country that the federal
government preempts the state's ability to tax Indian tribes and individuals.
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Venetie, "the federal set-aside
requirement also reflects the fact that because Congress has plenary power
over Indian affairs, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, some explicit action by
67. As the Supreme Court held in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker:
Respondents' argument is reduced to a claim that they may assess taxes on non-
Indians engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever there is no express
congressional statement to the contrary. This is simply not the law. In a
number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on
tribal reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit
statement on the subject. The court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a
significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980); see also Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
69. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). A
"dependent Indian community" must consist of lands set aside by the Federal Government
for the use of Indians as Indian land, and must be under federal superintendence. See
Foreman v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2001714557, 2001 WL 938972, at *3 (Or. Tax Magis.
Div. July 17, 2001) (holding that Klamath Indian was not exempt from Oregon state tax on
income earned through work as Tribal Chairman because Klamath County was not set aside




Congress (or the Executive, acting under delegated authority) must be taken
to create or to recognize Indian country. 7"
Congress or the Executive must act to create Indian Country. When it does
so, the exercise of jurisdiction and the encroachment of law is preempted:
The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question
is occupied by an "Indian community"; the federal superinten-
dence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is
sufficiently "dependent" on the Federal Government that the
Federal Government and the Indians involved, rather than the
States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land in
question.7'
The treaties or congressional acts establishing a reservation preclude the
extension of state income tax law to any Indians on that reservation.
"Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees
involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was the understanding that the internal
affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever
tribal government existed."' In McClanahan, the United States Supreme
Court, while noting that the Navajo Reservation was set aside for the
occupancy and use of the Navajos, held that state tax law did not extend to
Indians on the Navajo Reservation.73 The Supreme Court did not distinguish
between Navajos and other Indians residing on the Navajo Reservation.
Only Congress or action by the President of the United States may modify
the tenure of the Indians on a reservation. A state's attempt to levy a tax
based solely upon an Indian's residence within Indian Country, its core
purpose being to provide a refuge from state authority and a "home" for
Indians, is illogical, unjust, and violative of the rights guaranteed Indians by
the United States pursuant to its treaty making authority.
V. A State Has No Inherent Jurisdictional Authority Over Nonmember
Indians
The ability to determine and define a state's jurisdiction over Indians within
Indian Country is left solely to the federal government. Congress has
70. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531 n.6.
71. Id. at 521.
72. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959); see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
73. The Supreme Court held that the 1868 federal treaty between the Navajo and the
United States precluded Arizona state income taxation despite the fact that Arizona did not
become a state until 1912. McClanahan v. State Tax Comn'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 174-75
(1973).
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exercised this plenary power over Indian affairs by specifically rejecting the
contention that a state has inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
within Indian Country. In LaRock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited to
Duro v. Reina ' for the proposition that the state may tax the income of a
nonmember Indian residing within Indian Country. 5 The court also noted
that "Congress responded to the Court's invitation by passing the 'Duro fix'
which granted tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on tribal
lands."'  This is only part of the Duro story.
In Duro, the United States Supreme Court found that the Salt River Tribe
did not have criminal jurisdiction over a Mission Indian who killed a Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian on the Salt River Reservation." In response to
the Supreme Court's holding in Duro, Congress adopted Public Law 102-137,
commonly referred to as the "Duro fix." Citing United States v. Kagama,
the United States House of Representatives noted that federal courts
repeatedly hold that the term "Indian" includes any Indian in Indian Country,
without regard to tribal membership.' The House of Representatives
Conference Report noted:
[Tihe exception [to jurisdiction] is confined to those who by the
usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to
their race. It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race
generally, of the family of Indians; and it intended to leave them
both, as regarded their own tribe, and other tribes also, to be
governed by Indian usages and customs."'
The legislative history of Public Law 102-137 indicates that Congress
simultaneously recognized the multitribal nature of reservation populations
and supported tribal jurisdiction, for both civil and criminal matters, over all
Indians on reservations."' Reaffirming tribal governments' inherent"
74. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
75. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 913-14 (2001).
76. Id. at 914.
77. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
78. 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
79. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-261, at 4 (1991) (accompanying H.R. 972, ultimately
signed into law as Pub. L. No. 102-137).
80. Id. (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846)).
81. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It:
A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).
82. Not all legal scholars agree that Congress had the ability to recognize inherent tribal
sovereign authority when it enacted the "Duro fix":
Thus, we are presented with a legislative enactment purporting to recast history




criminal jurisdiction over all Indians on their reservations, the United States
Senate stated that congressional action:
[Is premised upon the reality and practice of reservation life: that
non-tribal member Indians own homes and property on reser-
vations, are part of the labor force on the reservation, and
frequently are married to tribal members. Non-tribal member
Indians receive the benefits of programs and services provided by
the tribal government. Their children attend tribal schools, and
their families receive health care services in tribal hospitals and
clinics.... In addition, over the course of many years, Federal
policy forced the relocation of many tribes onto one reservation."3
Far from distinguishing between member and nonmember Indians, Congress
acknowledged the extent which reservations are intertwined with Indians of
various tribal origins. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this analysis,
instead finding that "[a]lthough Congress granted 'Indian tribes' jurisdiction
over Indians committing a crime on their tribal lands, it does not follow that
Congress eliminated the distinction between Indian tribes. ""
Congress retains plenary authority over Indian affairs." Consequently,
Congress has the sole power to define a state's jurisdiction over Indian
Country, Indian tribes, and individual Indians." Despite the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's holding to the contrary in LaRock, Congress's "Duro fix"
not only overturned the United States Supreme Court's decision in Duro v.
Reina, it also legislatively confirmed that there is no inherent state jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians within Indian Country.
organizing principles by which the Indian tribes were incorporated into our
constitutional system of government. The question we must address, then, is
whether the amendment's authorization of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians is, as Congress asserted, simply a non-substantive "recognition" of
inherent rights that Indian tribes have always held or whether it constitutes an
affirmative delegation of power.
United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Gould, supra note
36 (arguing that the Supreme Court may find the "Duro fix" unconstitutional because it
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
83. S. REP. No. 102-153, at 7 (1991).
84. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 914 (2001).
85. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985); Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
86. For a discussion of the origin, rationale, and consequences of Congress' treatment
of Indians and Indian tribes, see David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The
Federal Government as Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 223 (2001).
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VI. Reversing the Presumption
Both Congress and the United States Supreme Court suffer from a lack of
precision and specificity when defining the respective roles of states and
tribes, especially in the area of Indian taxation. For example, in Montana v.
United States, the Supreme Court addressed the ability of the Crow Indian
Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned
in fee by "nonmembers of the Tribe.' 7 Throughout its decision, the
Supreme Court uses the term "nonmember" and "non-Indian" interchan-
geably. As the issue presented in Montana did not involve nonmember
Indians, and the decision did not address nonmember Indians at all, it is
unclear if the Court actually meant to draw this distinction. Congress is
equally imprecise in the drafting of statutes ostensibly designed to protect
tribal sovereignty."
Perhaps in part due to this imprecision, the "canon of construction" for
Indian law has evolved. The United States Supreme Court has stated on
numerous occasions that it must be guided by "that eminently sound and vital
canon ... that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes...
are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of
the Indians.""9 Courts must "avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power."" According to conventional wisdom, the
essential point of the canons is to encourage narrow construction against
invasions of Indian interests and broad construction favoring Indian rights.9'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court utilized the opposite analysis to reach its
conclusion, noting that "LaRock has not cited any other federal law as having
preempted the State from imposing income tax in such a situation."' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not presume that the income of the Indian
taxpayer was immune from taxation. Instead, the court examined the
applicable treaties and federal laws to determine if they explicitly exempted
the income of Ms. LaRock from taxation.93 Such an analysis stands federal
Indian tax law on its head.
87. 450 U.S. 544. 556-57 (1981).
88. See supra notes 36, 80, and accompanying text for discussion regarding "Duro fix."
89. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
90. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
91. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1141 (1990).
92. LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 916 (2001).




Contrary to the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock, there
exists a presumption against the state's power to tax Indians or Indian
property in Indian Country. State jurisdiction does not generally lie within
reservation boundaries. The assertion of taxing authority is not excepted from
this principle. 4 In order to overcome this presumption, the state must point
to express congressional consent to tax Indians or their property in Indian
Country. "This is so because ... Indians stand in a special relation to the
federal government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress
has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow states
to treat Indians as part of the general community."" The tradition of Indian
sovereignty requires that "the rule [of federal reluctance to interfere with state
taxation] be reversed" when addressing the State's power to tax Indians or
Indian property on reservations." "[T]he policy of leaving Indians free from
state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history. " '
Income earned from Indian Country is presumed to be beyond the state's
taxing jurisdiction. The earning of income is substantially connected to the
land, and is taxed based on the residence of the tax payer. This is what
distinguishes taxation of income from sales taxation or transactions in
personalty. In those cases that relate to an Indian deriving income from
Indian Country, the tax is presumed impermissible unless specifically allowed
by Congress:
However relevant the land-income distinction may be in other
contexts, it is plainly irrelevant when, as here, the tax is resisted
because the State is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the
people and the land it seeks to tax. In such a situation, the State
has no more jurisdiction to reach income generated on reservation
lands than to tax the land itself.98
If the activity is substantially connected to Indian Country, the state is
presumed not to have the ability to tax the activity unless Congress
specifically grants such ability. "It is clear that the exemption accorded tribal
and restricted Indian lands extends to the income derived directly
therefrom.""
94. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 257 (1992).
95. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
United States, 319 U.S. 598, 613-14 (1943)).
96. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124 (1993).
97. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (citing Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)).
98. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
99. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 9 (1956) (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
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The United States Supreme Court consistently draws a distinction between
transactions based in personalty and those related to Indian income." In
McClanahan, the State of Arizona attempted to impose a tax on the income
of a Navajo Indian residing on the Navajo Reservation whose income was
"wholly derived from reservation sources.".'.. The Supreme Court did not
examine the source of Rosalind McClanahan's income to determine the
existence of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme regarding the source
of her income. In fact, McClanahan fails to mention how Ms. McClanahan
was employed in the years in question. The Court simply concluded that
by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State had
interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave
to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the
Indians themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as applied to
reservation Indians with income derived wholly from reservation
sources. 102
The rule of McClanahan should also control when a nonmember Indian
resides and derives her income from Indian Country. "
In LaRoque v. State, the Supreme Court of Montana noted the importance
of this "coalescence of situs (reservation) and status (Indian)."'' The
LaRoque court found that Montana had no taxation jurisdiction over the
income of an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe of
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 265 (1942)).
100. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 466 (1976) (holding that in
the absence of congressional consent the state was disabled from imposing a personal
property tax on motor vehicles owned by Indians living in Indian Country, but could impose
a tax on the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians); Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381 (holding that Public
Law 280 did not grant the states the authority to tax "Indians or Indian property on
reservations").
101. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165.
102. Id.
103. The District Court of Montana clarified the meaning of non-Indian:
Defendants seek a clarification of the term "Non-Indian", contending that with
respect to the sale of cigarettes on the Flathead Reservation anyone who is not
an enrolled member of the plaintiff Tribes is a non-Indian. We do not agree.
The cases and texts discussed supra refer generally to reservation Indians or
Indians residing on the reservation. We conclude that all Indians residing on the
Flathead Reservation are exempt from the payment of the cigarette tax.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (D.C. Mont. 1975).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted that the State of Montana had not
challenged this holding and the Court would consequently not rule on it. Moe, 425 U.S. at
481 n.16.




North Dakota or an unenrolled Chippewa Indian of mixed heritage, stating
that "tribal affiliation was unimportant as long as situs on a reservation and
status as an Indian coalesced.""' The court went on to find that:
Since both appellants are Indians residing on the reservation, and
since each of their incomes were derived wholly from reservation
sources, their activity is "totally within the sphere which the
relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal Government and
for the Indians themselves." Therefore, we hold the State was
without authority to impose its income tax on these Indian
residents of an Indian reservation."5
The Supreme Court of North Dakota made a similar finding in White Eagle
v. Dorgan.H
n
For Indians that live and work in Indian Country, a state "is totally lacking
in jurisdiction over the people and the lands it seeks to tax." '' In order to
overcome the presumption that states are unable to tax an Indian in Indian
Country, a state must show that Congress expressly provided for state
taxation of the activity in question:"
In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress
can authorize the imposition of taxes on Indian tribes and
individual Indians. It has not done so often, and the Court
consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption from
state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do
so unmistakably clear."
Indians are not treated as part of the "general community" for taxation
purposes. The state must show that Congress manifested a clear intent to
terminate an Indian's tax immunity before a court may find that it has been
so terminated:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction
or other federal statutes, there has been no satisfactory authority
for taxing. . . Indian income from activities carried on within the
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1064-65. The Supreme Court of Montana cited LaRoque with deference in
State v. Bird, 829 P.2d 941, 943 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the State of Montana lacks
authority to impose individual income taxes on an Indian residing within Indian Country and
deriving income from Indian Country).
107. 209 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1973).
108. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973).
109. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
110. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759,765 (1985) (emphasis added).
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boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to rest any
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permis-
sible absent congressional consent."'
None of the Acts passed by Congress regarding the jurisdiction of the
states over Indian Country specifically grant the power to tax the income of
Indians residing in, and deriving their income from, Indian Country. If
Congress is silent, the state has no jurisdiction to impose its tax.
One might be tempted to assume that a state tax on the income of an
Indian in Indian Country has a substantial burden of proof to overcome. The
combination of two presumptions, the "narrow construction in favor of Indian
interest" presumption and the "presumption against state jurisdiction to tax,"
might seem at first glance to be an insurmountable obstacle to state taxation.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in LaRock illustrates, however,
these presumptions are as useful as a left-handed spatula. On November 27,
2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Chickasaw Nation v. United
States that tribal governments are not exempt from the federal pull-tab excise
and occupation taxes."' The Chickasaw Nation argued that Congress, in
passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,"' intended to treat tribal
governments on par with state and local governments for purposes of federal
gambling tax laws. The Supreme Court found that tribal governments are not
entitled to exemption from federal excise taxes because the Internal Revenue
Code contained what the Court found to be a "mistake."' The most telling
point of the Court's discussion on this topic is its evaluation of the applicable
canons of construction:
Moreover, the canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to
benefit the tribes is offset by the canon that warns us against
interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions unless
those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say that the
pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger - particularly where the
interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian
treaty is at issue. This Court's earlier cases are too individualized,
involving too many different kinds of legal circumstances, to
warrant any such assessment about the two canons' relative
strength. "5
111. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (citation omitted).
112. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 86 (2001).
113. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
114. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. at 91.




VI. Balancing State, Federal, and Tribal Interests
"[T]he federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very
strong and that the state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to rebalance these interests in every case. "'16
It was not the intent of the United States Supreme Court when it decided
McClanahan to require each state attempting taxation of an Indian's income
to review the federal regulatory scheme related to that individual's oc-
cupation. The United States Supreme Court employs a "categorical" approach
to determine if Indians that live in, and derive their income from, Indian
Country are subject to state income taxation:
We have balanced federal, state, and tribal interests in diverse
contexts, notably, in assessing state regulation that does not
involve taxation. . . . But when a State attempts to levy a tax
directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian country,
rather than on non-Indians, we have employed instead of a
balancing inquiry, a "more categorical approach: '[A]bsent cession
of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,' we have held,
a State is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation
Indians." . . . Taking this categorical approach, we have held
unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal incidence
rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian country.""
The category that the United States Supreme Court has defined is an Indian
that resides in Indian Country and derives her income from Indian Country.
If the taxpayer is a non-Indian, or the taxpayer does not reside or derive
income from Indian Country, then the income may be taxable based on the
specific circumstances. It is at this point that the "particularized inquiry into
the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake" enunciated by the
Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker is utilized.'
For example, in White Mountain, the State of Arizona sought to impose a
motor carrier license tax and use fuel tax on a non-Indian logging company
operating solely within the boundaries of the Fort Apache Reservation."9
The state assessed these taxes on all commercial users of its highways. The
116. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (citing
Jones, 411 U.S. at 148).
117. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1985) (emphasis
added) (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 251 (citation omitted)).
118. 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
119. Id. at 139.
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Supreme Court initially noted that "when on-reservation conduct involving
only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's
regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest."'' " The Court went on
to analyze the nature of the proposed tax. Because the tax was not substan-
tially connected to the land, the Court utilized the second "barrier to the
assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members,"
namely, a balancing of the federal, state, and tribal interests in the ac-
tivity.' The Court concluded that the tax proposed by the State of Arizona
was impermissible, as the federal and tribal interests in the logging industry
performed solely on the reservation outweighed the state's interest in raising
revenues.'
Similarly, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation," the Supreme Court reviewed the State of Washington's
attempt to tax the sale of cigarettes on the Colville Indian Reservation to
nonmember Indians and non-Indians. The taxes concerned "transactions in
personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands."" The
Supreme Court found Washington's taxes permissible, as they were
"reasonably designed to prevent the Tribes from marketing their tax
exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant tribal services and
who would otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations."'"
The key to the Supreme Court's analysis in Colville was that the transaction
involved the taxation of goods. The Court employed a balancing test of the
state and tribe's interest in the activity in question, and found that the tribe
did not have an interest in the imposition of a sales tax not substantially
connected to the Indian Country in question.
The "categorical" approach enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chickasaw
is the appropriate means by which a court should review a state's ability to
tax an Indian's income. However, even if the White Mountain balancing test
is utilized, the federal and tribal interests in the income of Indians living and
working in Indian Country heavily outweigh any state interest in the same
income. The federal government has an interest in promoting and regulating
the employment of Indians in Indian Country and in keeping Indian families
together. Indian tribes have an interest in the income of Indians, whether
members or nonmembers, earned within Indian Country, as well as services
120. Id. at 144.
121. Id. at 145-53.
122. Id. at 152.
123. 447 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).
124. Id. at 156.




the tribe provides to those Indians. A state's only interest in the income of
Indians earned in Indian Country is in taxing it. This is a case "in which the
state has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it.'
A. Federal Interest in Nonmember Income
"[T]he federal and tribal interests arise from the broad power of Congress
to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl.
3, and from the semi-autonomous status of Indian tribes."' Congress his-
torically and continuously expresses an interest in promoting the employment
and welfare of Indians, taking direct action to support Indian employment
with the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and by
explicitly exempting from its coverage the preferential employment of Indians
by Indian Tribes or by industries located on or near Indian reservations."
In Mancari, the Supreme Court found that "[tihis exemption is consistent
with the Federal Government's policy of encouraging Indian employment and
with the special legal position of Indians."''"
More recently, Congress expressed an intent to promote Indian employment
through passage of sections 13,321 and 13,322 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993."' The Act provides tax incentives for the
establishment of businesses in Indian Country and for hiring Indians and their
spouses. The incentives offered are not limited to the hiring of members of
that particular reservation's tribe, demonstrating the importance and need of
providing employment to all Indians in Indian Country. Congress' recognition
of the need to provide income to Indians through increased employment
opportunities distinguishes income tax from any other taxes imposed in
Indian Country.
The federal government also strongly supports keeping Indian families
together. In an effort to stop the removal of Indian children from their
reservations and the break up of Indian families, Congress passed the Indian
Child Welfare Act."' The Wisconsin Supreme Court's failure to recognize
the validity of a nonmember Indian's status as an Indian and encourage her
presence on the reservation where her children are enrolled contradicts this
effort to keep Indian families together.
126. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989).
127. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982)
(citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1973)).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (2000); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 545 (1974).
129. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 546 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964)).
130. 26 U.S.C. §§ 168(j), 45(A) (2000).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2000).
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The federal government established a vast regulatory scheme both to
promote Indian employment and to oversee those employed within Indian
Country. Accordingly, the federal government has an interest in the
employment of nonmember Indians and in their residence in Indian Country
that outweighs any state interest in taxing income earned by nonmember
Indians.
B. Tribal Interest in Nonmember Income
A tribe also has an interest in nonmembers that live and work in its Indian
Country. Under treaties creating Indian Country, a tribe's interests include
protecting and providing a home for all Indians within its borders. The
jurisdiction of a tribe extends to all Indians within its borders, both members
and nonmembers.'32
Tribal powers extend "over both their members and their territory." '33
These powers can extend over members going beyond reservation boundaries,
as well as individuals within those boundaries. Most tribes have laws that
affect employment, including wage laws, employee incentive laws, conflict
of interest laws, and whistle blower laws. Tribes also provide services to all
Indians within their jurisdiction, whether members or nonmembers. Such
services include trash pickup, public transit, food distribution, utility services,
funeral expenses, public schooling, health services, travel monies for
attending a funeral, and higher education reimbursement. The receipt of
"significant tribal services" is an important consideration in balancing the
interests of the state, the federal government, and the tribe.'"
A tribe has a further interest in keeping its children with their Indian
families. The Supreme Court recognized the overwhelming interest that an
Indian tribe has in its children in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield.' The Supreme Court implies in Holyfield that the correct angle
from which a court should view ethnicity and the cultural ties of an Indian
within Indian country is from the vantage point of the tribe's interests.
In LaRock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a nonmember Indian
was subject to the State of Wisconsin's income tax, noting that "The fact
is that LaRock - who is an enrolled member of the Menonminee [sic]
Tribe - has no voice in the affairs of the Oneida Tribe as she may in the
affairs of the Menominee Tribe."3 ' In Re Mehojah raised a similar ar-
132. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
133. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
134. Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
135. 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).




gument before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. The Idaho Board found
that the State of Idaho had no jurisdiction to tax the income of a nonmem-
ber Indian working for the Shoshonee-Bannock Tribe on the Fort Hall
Reservation:
The case of McClanahan v. State Tax Commission . . . is
decisive of the present case. In McClanahan, the State of
Arizona attempted to collect a tax from a Navajo Indian on
income wholly earned within the Navajo Reservation. The
Supreme Court held that it could not do so. The Tax
Commission attempted to distinguish the present case from
McClanahan on the ground that Appellant was not a member
of the tribe living on the reservation, and that therefore the
tax imposed did not interfere with tribal self government.
But the Supreme Court considered and rejected this ar-
gument in McClanahan .... Respondent assumed that since
Appellant could not vote in tribal elections held on the Fort
Hall Reservation, state action did not interfere with tribal self
government, but such argument is patently specious.""
The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals went on to find that the State of Idaho has
no jurisdiction to tax the income of an Indian residing in and deriving such
income from Indian Country, regardless of his tribal affiliation. This holding
is now codified in the Idaho Tax Guidelines.
While it is true that nonmember Indians cannot vote in tribal elections, the
same may be said of many tribal members. For instance, the Oneida
Constitution does not allow tribal members to vote in elections until they are
twenty-one years of age, yet they can be employed before this date. Despite
being unable to participate in tribal elections, an eighteen-year-old Oneida
Indian residing on the Oneida reservation and deriving her income from the
Oneida reservation would not be subject to the State of Wisconsin's income
taxation. The inability to vote does not grant the state the ability to tax.
137. No. 73-1-27, 1974 WL 21924, at *3 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. Feb. 1974) (citations
omitted).
138. IDAHO CODE § 63-3026A(4)(b)(iv) (2002). The instructions in the Idaho tax
pamphlet state that Native Americans enrolled as members of a federally recognized tribe,
living and working on a reservation, may deduct all income received from employment on
the reservation if the income is included on the front of Form 43. Income earned off the
reservation cannot be deducted, nor can income earned on the reservation if you live off the
reservation. In re Mettler, No. 97-B-764, 1998 WL 208151, at *2 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. Apr.
13, 1998).
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C. State Interest in Nonmember Income
A state's power to tax depends on its jurisdiction over the objects of
taxation. In Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., the United States Supreme Court
set forth the simple but controlling question - namely, "whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask in return."'' The key to this
analysis is whether the state's interest in the income of the Indian is different
if the Indian resides on the Menominee Reservation or the Oneida Reser-
vation. There is an insufficient nexus between the Indian's status as a
Menominee Indian and the Oneida Reservation's location in the State of
Wisconsin to support the State's imposition of its income tax in Indian
Country.
In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Zeuske, " the Wisconsin Western District addressed a related question. A
member of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
living on the Lac du Flambeau reservation in Wisconsin protested the State
of Wisconsin's attempts to tax income earned in the State of Minnesota from
employment as a truck driver. The state argued that the interests of the Lac
du Flambeau did not extend to tribal members who go beyond the reservation
in order to earn money.'" Judge Crabb held that the state had no authority
to tax the income, noting that the State of Wisconsin did not cite to any
statute authorizing it to impose taxes on Indians based solely on residency on
a reservation located within the state.4"
The majority of other states to consider this issue have already ack-
nowledged that they have no jurisdiction to tax the income of Indians
residing in, and deriving their income from, Indian Country. The State of
Oregon passed a statute specifically exempting "[a]ny income derived from
sources within the boundaries of federally recognized Indian Country in
Oregon by any enrolled member of a federally recognized American Indian
Tribe residing in federally recognized Indian country" from state taxation." 3
California also exempts "Indian-owned units located on an Indian reservation
or Rancheria" from taxation.'"M The Indian must simply be a "member of
a federally recognized American Indian Tribe" and reside on a "Indian
Reservation or Rancheria."'' 5 These states do not differentiate between
139. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
140. 145 F. Supp. 2d 969 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
141. Id. at 974.
142. Id. at 975.
143. OR. STAT. § 316.777 (2001).
144. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 25, § 5664 (2002).




members of different tribes living in Indian Country. The New York
Attorney General issued a Formal Opinion that "[i]ncome earned from
employment on an Indian reservation by an Indian who resides on such
reservation is not subject to New York State personal income tax."'"
Wisconsin did not join North Dakota, Idaho, Oregon, California, and New
York in finding that a state has no jurisdiction to tax nonmember Indians
living and working in Indian Country.
VII. Conclusion
Ms. LaRock is an Indian who lives in Indian Country and derives her
income solely from Indian Country. She is currently subjected to Wisconsin
state income tax on the basis that she is not living and working on her own
tribe's reservation.
Federal, not state, law determines an individual's status as an "Indian" and
what constitutes "Indian country." Congress never expressly granted the State
of Wisconsin the power to tax Indians living on the Oneida Reservation.
Nevertheless, under the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in LaRock, the
State of Wisconsin may tax the income of Joan LaRock.
In order to reverse precedent like LaRock, Indian tribes must take a more
active role in the legislative and judicial processes. For example, the Oneida
or Menominee Tribes could have brought Ms. LaRock's claim in federal
court, rather than proceeding through state court.'"' A federal judge may
have given a more favorable review to Ms. LaRock's claim. Another
alternative would be the passage of taxation legislation by the Oneida and
Menominee Tribes, similar to the reciprocity agreements entered into between
states for taxation purposes.'" Such agreements might balance the scales in
favor of the "tribal interests" in the income of nonmember Indians, such as
Joan LaRock, residing in Indian Country. A final alternative would be the
passage of state legislation specifically exempting Indian income from Indian
Country within the state, regardless of tribal membership, such as that in
146. 76 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. 1977.
147. See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Zeuske,
145 F. Supp. 2d 969 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
148. "Our conclusion in no way limits the Tribes' ample opportunity to advance their
interests when they choose to do so." Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S.
32, 38 (1999) (holding that a company owned and operated by a Blackfeet Indian which built
and repaired roads on the Navajo, Hopi, Fort Apache, Colorado River, Tohono O'Odham, and
San Carlos Apache Indian Reservations in Arizona was subject to state gross proceeds tax).
"As the company concedes, Blaze is the equivalent of a non-Indian for purposes of this case
because none of its work occurred on the Blackfeet Reservation." Id. at 34.
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Oregon and California.'49 A more likely alternative to such legislation might
be an agreement between the State and the tribes exempting nonmember
income in exchange for other taxation stipulations, such as cigarette and gas
sales to non-Indians.
While the door is not forever closed on nonmember Indians seeking to
enjoy the same level of freedom from state interference as their tribal
member counterparts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly expressed its
view of Indians within Indian Country. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the presumption against state taxation when it found that Wisconsin
has jurisdiction to tax a Menominee Indian's income earned on the Oneida
Reservation. In Wisconsin, an Indian is only an Indian on her own reser-
vation.
149. See supra Part V.
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